The Conceptualist Argument for God\u27s Existence by Smith, Quentin
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 11 Issue 1 Article 3 
1-1-1994 
The Conceptualist Argument for God's Existence 
Quentin Smith 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Smith, Quentin (1994) "The Conceptualist Argument for God's Existence," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of 
the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 11 : Iss. 1 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol11/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
THE CONCEPTUALIST ARGUMENT 
FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE 
Quentin Smith 
The familiar types of argument for God's existence include the cosmological, 
teleological and ontological arguments. The aim of this paper is to introduce 
a new type of argument, the conceptualist argument. The argument is that the 
conjunction of actualism and conceptualism entails Anselmian theism, that 
God exists in every possible world. According to actualism, possibilities are 
propositions, and according to conceptualism, propositions are effects of 
mental causes. The addition of other premises enables the conclusion to be 
deduced that in every possible world, every true proposition is a mental effect 
of the same mind, the divine mind. This article also discusses intimations of 
the conceptualist argument in Leibniz and in contemporary philosophers such 
as Plantinga. I conclude that the conceptualist argument may be rationally 
acceptable, but is not rationally compelling. 
I 
The aim of this paper is to make more explicit a type of argument for God's 
existence that has been given only scant attention in the literature. I shall call 
this argument the conceptualist argument and shall consider it as an addition 
to the family of arguments that includes the cosmological argument, the 
teleological argument, the ontological argument, the arguments from mystical 
experience and from moral conscience. In Section II the key terms are defined 
and in Section III the argument is set forth and claimed to be valid. In Section 
IV some previous intimations of this argument in the literature are discussed. 
In Section V, I address the issue of the soundness or unsoundness of the 
argument. 
II 
The conceptualist argument for God's existence (or at least the versions I 
shall develop in this paper) involves three main premises, conceptualism, 
actualism, and a premise about the necessary uniqueness of a certain divine 
attribute. 
Conceptualism with respect to propositions is the theory that it is neces-
sarily the case that propositions are effects of mental causes. It is necessarily 
true that for any x, if x is a proposition, then x is an effect of some proposi-
tional attitude. It may be said that the conceiving of a proposition (which 
may be taken as an element common to all propositional attitudes) is what 
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sustains the proposition in existence, such that the proposition exists by virtue 
of this conceiving. Conceptualism should not be defined as the thesis that it 
is necessarily the case that propositions are accusatives of propositional atti-
tudes, since this precludes a philosopher from being both a platonist and an 
Anselmian theist. An Anselmian theist holds that God exists in every possible 
world and thus that in every possible world every proposition is an accusative 
of God's propositional attitudes; this could be held consistently with plato-
nism, the thesis that propositions exist necessarily and by virtue of their 
natures, and not by virtue of being conceived by some mind. Conceptualism 
entails that it is necessary that every proposition is an accusative of some 
propositional attitude, but this entailment is not the thesis of conceptualism, 
which is that it is necessary that every proposition is an effect of some 
propositional attitude. 
It has been objected to this distinction that if conceptualism entails the 
accusative thesis, then an Anselmian theist is still precluded from being a 
platonist. But this objection is unwarranted, since the Anselmian theist can 
hold the entailment (the accusative thesis) without holding the proposition 
that entails it (the conceptualist thesis). The Anselmian theist would be pre-
cluded from being a platonist if the accusative thesis entailed the conceptu-
alist thesis, but there is no such entailment. 
One reason I call my conceptualist arguments "versions" of the conceptu-
alist argument is that they include the thesis of actualism, and I do not wish 
to preclude the possibility that conceptualist arguments without this premise 
may be constructed. Actualism is the theory that defines possibilities in terms 
of a subclass of actualities, namely, propositions. l "It is possible that there is 
a red unicorn" is analyzed as meaning "There exists the possibly true propo-
sition that some unicorn is red." The versions of the conceptualist argument 
I shall construct involve the claim that the conjunction of conceptualism, 
actualism and a third premise about the uniqueness of a certain divine attrib-
ute entails Anselmian theism, the thesis that God exists in every possible 
world. 
III 
One version of the conceptualist argument begins as follows. If actualism is 
true, then there exist propositions in every possible world; this follows from 
the fact that possibilities are possibly true propositions. If actualism and 
conceptualism are both true, it follows that there is some mind in every 
possible world. If there is some possible world W in which there is no mind, 
then either (1) the propositions in Ware not effects of some mind(s), which 
contradicts conceptualism, or (2) the possibilities in Ware not propositions, 
which contradicts actualism, or (3) there are no possibilities in W, which 
contradicts the assumption that W is possible. But "there exists some mind 
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in every possible world" does not entail that God exists in every possible 
world. Indeed, it does not even entail that God actually exists, since different 
minds exist in different worlds and no divine mind may actually exist. Per-
haps the only minds that actually exist are human and animal minds. 
A missing link in the argument is a statement to the effect that there exists 
at least one proposition that can be an accusative (and thus an effect) only of 
a divine mind. A possible candidate for this statement is that there exists a 
certain proposition that can be an accusative only of an omniscient mind. The 
actual world is an infinitely complex conjunction (not a set!)2 of all true 
propositions; it is an accusative only of an omniscient mind.3 It follows that 
an omniscient mind actually exists. 
It may be objected to this line of reasoning that there could actually exist 
an infinite number of non-omniscient minds, such that for each different part 
(conjunct) of the actual world, there is a different non-omniscient mind that 
knows that part. This would allow us to say that there exists the actual world, 
that there is no part of this world that is not an accusative of some mind, but 
that no divinity exists. 
The response to this objection is that it commits the fallacy of composition. 
"Each part of the actual world is an accusative" no more entails "the actual 
world is an accusative" than "each conjunct of p is an accusative" entails "p 
is an accusative." If that red is a color is an accusative of John's mind and 
that green is a color is an accusative of Jane's mind, that does not entail that 
red is a color and green is a color is an accusative of some mind. For the 
latter to be an accusative, there must be some mind that grasps the conjunction 
of the two propositions that John and Jane separately grasp. Thus, if the actual 
world and not just each of its parts is an accusative, there must be some mind 
that grasps the conjunction of all true propositions and this mind will be 
omniscient. Furthermore, there must be some mind that grasps the actual 
world, for a conjunction of all true propositions is itself a proposition and 
every proposition is an accusative of some mind. 
A similar argument shows that God exists in every possible world. Each 
possible world W is a maximal conjunction of propositions, such that every 
proposition or its negation is a conjunct of W. Each merely possible world 
W' is such that it might have been actual; if W' had been actual, then W' 
would have contained only true conjuncts. This entails (given conceptualism) 
that if W' were to be actual, W' would be an accusative of an omniscient 
mind. This is logically equivalent to the assertion that if W' were to be actual, 
an omniscient mind would be actual. Given a third premise that is entailed 
by the necessary coextensivity of the divine attributes, the premise that there 
possibly exists no x such that x is omniscient and different than God, it 
follows that God exists in every possible world. 
But this version of the conceptualist argument for Anselmian theism is not 
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complete as it stands, since it is open to the objection that an omniscient mind 
is not required by the conceptualist and actualist premises but merely a mind 
that conceives possible worlds. Conceptualism states that a proposition is an 
effect of some mind and a proposition need not be known or even believed 
to be an effect of a mind; it need merely be conceived. Accordingly, in order 
for the maximal proposition that is the actual world to be an effect of some 
mind, it need not be known by a mind but merely conceived, and the same 
holds for each other world. Thus the conceptualist and actualist premises 
entail merely that there is a mind that conceives possible worlds, not that 
there is an omniscient mind. Accordingly, a supplemental premise is needed 
about the relation between the divine attribute of omniscience and the attrib-
ute of conceiving everything that God knows. The premise is that 
(1) Necessarily, only God is omniscient and if a being x knows every true 
proposition, then there is no being y different from x that conceives 
every proposition that x knows. 
Obviously, if God knows every true proposition, he conceives every true 
proposition and (1) adds to this obvious claim the assertion that only God 
conceives every proposition that God knows. Thus, we need the supplemen-
tary premise (1) in order for the conceptualist argument for Anselmian theism 
to go through. 
(1) is not needed to rule out the possibility that there be a nondivine mind 
that knows every true proposition and yet believes some false ones, since this 
possibility is precluded for other reasons. For each true proposition p, if x 
knows p, then p is justified for x, which implies that x does not believe not-po 
It follows from this that if x knows all truths, then x has no false beliefs. 
I am assuming for the sake of simplicity that there are no indexical propo-
sitions (although there are indexical sentences), such as the propositions that 
I am Quentin Smith and that I am here rather than there, since God would 
not believe all of these propositions. If there are indexical propositions, then 
"God knows all true propositions" should be taken to mean "God knows all 
true non indexical propositions." 
A different argument for Anselmian theism may be constructed using the 
conceptualist and actualist premises and a different third premise, viz., that 
it is impossible that there exists an x such that x is a necessarily existent mind 
and different from God. I take it to be a sound modal intuition that there is 
some possible world in which there are no contingently existent minds. In 
this world, however, there will be propositions (given actualism) and some 
mind(s) (given conceptualism). Since the mind(s) cannot be contingently 
existent, the mind(s) must be necessarily existent. Given the premise that it 
is impossible that there exists an x such that x is a necessarily existent mind 
and different from God, it follows that there is only one necessarily existent 
mind in this world and that this mind is God. 
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Another version of the conceptualist argument can be constructed that does 
not rely on the modal intuition that there is a possible world devoid of 
contingent minds. Instead, one may rely on the premise that there is some 
possible world in which contingent minds exist at some but not all times. 
Since some propositions exist at all times, there will be times at which 
propositions exist but are not accusatives of contingent minds. Since the 
propositions must be accusatives of some mind(s), it follows that at these 
times they are accusatives of some necessary mind(s). Given the premise that 
it is impossible that there exists an x such that x is a necessarily existent mind 
and different from God, it follows that there is only one necessary mind of 
which these propositions are accusatives and that this mind is God. 
This last argument requires the additional premise that in the possible world 
mentioned, propositions exist at times. This premise is obviously false on 
some definitions of "time," e.g., the Einsteinian definition that entails that 
something is in time if and only if it is connectable to a physical event by a 
light or slower signal. But there are other more liberal definitions of "time" 
that entail that propositions exist in time. It may be argued4 that a sufficient 
condition of existing in time is that something acquire or lose any n-adic property, 
such as the property of being an accusative of John's mind. Given this partial 
definition of "time," it follows that the propositions exist in time in the world in 
question and that this version of the conceptualist argument goes through. 
IV 
There is rarely anything that is completely new in philosophy and it would 
be surprising indeed if no intimations of the conceptualist argument could be 
found in previous literature. One of the earliest intimations is this passage in 
Aquinas's De Veritate: 
Even if there were no human intellects, there could be truths because of their 
relation to the divine intellect. But if, per impossibile, there were no intellects 
at all, but things continued to exist, then there would be no such reality as 
truth.s 
This passage suggests a commitment to conceptualism, but it falls short of 
being a conceptualist argument for God's existence (in the sense outlined in 
Sections II-III) if only for the reason that actualism is not a premise of an 
argument for the existence of a divine intellect. In fact, Aquinas does not 
seem to be suggesting an argument for God's necessary existence on the basis 
of the necessary existence of truths, but an argument for the necessary exist-
ence of truths on the basis of the premise that there necessarily exists at least 
one intellect, the divine one. 
A closer approximation to the conceptualist argument can be found in 
Leibniz's Monadology; Leibniz argues from the reality of possibilities to the 
existence of God: 
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if there is reality in essences or possibilities, or indeed in eternal truths, this 
reality must be founded on something existent and actual, and consequently 
on the existence of the necessary being in whom essence involves existence, 
or in whom to be possible is itself to be actual.. .. Without [God] there would 
be nothing real in the possibilities-not only nothing existent, but also noth-
ing possible.6 
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If we take the first occurrence of "or" in the first sentence as indicating that 
essences are possibilities (Leibniz's version of actualism; see Monadology, 
sec. 43), then we have this argument: 
(2) Essences are possibilities 
(3) The reality of possibilities is dependent on something actual. 
Therefore, 
(4) The reality of essences requires the actuality of the necessary being, 
God. 
Although this argument is invalid, further premises can be drawn from Leib-
niz's own philosophy to make the argument valid. For example, one such 
premise is that there are an infinite number of truths involving essences in 
each possible world. But in lieu of excavating all the suppressed premises I will 
point out an important difference between Leibniz's argument and the versions 
of the conceptualist argument I have outlined. I argued from the existence of 
possibilities to the existence of God, but Leibniz argues from the reality of 
possibilities (what makes something a real possibility or a "metaphysical possi-
bility" in contemporary jargon, as opposed to a merely logical or epistemic 
possibility) to something that grounds this reality. This is suggested by Leibniz's 
above-quoted remark that "Without [God] there would be nothing real in the 
possibilities-not only nothing existent, but also nothing possible" (my italics). 
Impossibilities, merely epistemic possibilities and metaphysical possibili-
ties all exist, but only the latter are real, capable of being actualized. What 
makes something really possible, Leibniz seems to be implicitly suggesting, 
is God's ability to actualize it. In Leibniz's terminology of essences, a premise 
of my argument is that an essence exists if and only if God entertains it, 
whereas the crucial premise of Leibniz's suggested argument is that an es-
sence is a real possibility if and only if God has the ability to actualize it. 
Contemporary intimations of the conceptualist argument can be found in 
articles by Alvin Plantinga, by Christopher Menzel and Thomas Morris, and 
by Brian Leftow.7 I shall consider the first of these to appear, Plantinga's 
"How to be an Anti-Realist." Plantinga puts forth the conceptualist line: 
How could there be truths totally independent of minds or persons? .. How 
could the things that are in fact true or false-propositions, let's say-exist 
in serene and majestic independence of persons and their means of apprehen-
sion? How could there be propositions no one has ever so much as grasped 
or thought of?s 
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Plantinga presents the theistic argument in the form a thesis, an antithesis, 
and a synthesis: 
The thesis, then, is that truth cannot be independent of noetic activity on the 
part of persons. The antithesis is that it must be independent of our noetic 
activity. And the synthesis is that truth is independent of our intellectual 
activity but not of God's.9 
Although Plantinga is an actualist, actualism does not play a part in his 
argument. Accordingly, he cannot derive Anselmian theism without the addi-
tional premise that there are propositions in every possible world. Unless this 
premise is itself based on actualism (i.e., on the theory that a possibility is a 
proposition and that every possible world is a conjunction of propositions), 
then some additional argument is needed to show that propositions exist in 
every possible world. For example, a conceptualist who is neither an An-
selmian theist nor an actualist might argue that there are some possible worlds 
in which there are no minds and thus no propositions. He would not argue 
that in these worlds that it is false that (say) 2 plus 2 equals 4, but that in 
these worlds there exists no proposition that 2 plus 2 equals 4 and thus 
nothing that is true or false. There would exist matter, but no minds and thus 
no propositions formed or created by these minds. To the objection that if 
there were matter then it would be true that there were matter, he would 
respond that this objection presupposes platonism and thus is question-beg-
ging against conceptualism. According to conceptualism, in order for it to be 
true that there is matter there must not only be matter but also a mind that 
can construct this truth through its noetic activity. Thus, without the actualist 
premise (and without the question-begging assumption that God exists in 
every possible world), it is not obvious that there is a reason for a conceptu-
alist to believe that propositions exist in every possible world. Accordingly, 
unless Plantinga invokes actualism, or introduces some independent argument 
that propositions exists in every possible world, his argument will not be a 
valid argument for Anselmian theism. 
But I would like to draw attention to a feature of Planting a's discussion of 
this argument that bears upon some claims I shall shortly put forth, namely, 
that there really is no good argument for the conceptualist premise but merely 
an intuition. Plantinga calls "anti-realism" a doctrine more or less similar to 
conceptualism and says 
there is strong intuitive support for it or something like it. This intuition is 
often dressed up in fancy argumentative clothes of one sort or another, partly 
because, these days, one feels the need of argument for respectability. But 
the arguments aren't successful; and what there is of substance here is just 
this intuition, this impulse towards anti-realism. 1O 
In one respect I think Plantinga is right, but he has stated his case one-sidedly. 
For if there is "strong intuitive support" for conceptualism, then why do 
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platonists and nominalists find conceptualism counterintuitive and, indeed, 
downright false? It would seem more accurate to say that there are no knock-
down arguments for conceptualism, platonism or nominalism and that the 
issue comes down in the end to a matter of intuitions, with some people 
finding conceptualism to have "strong intuitive support" and others finding 
platonism or nominalism to have "strong intuitive support." But this state-
ment itself needs some argumentative support: 
v 
Many philosophers would hold that the key premise needing support to make 
the conceptualist argument compelling is the premise that conceptualism is 
true. I would like here to examine the claim that humans are not in an 
epistemic situation where they can conclusively establish or refute this prem-
ise and that in this respect this premise is similar to some of the key premises 
of some of the traditional types of theistic argument, such as the cosmological 
and ontological arguments. But, as I have suggested, this is not the same point 
that Plantinga makes about conceptualism, that there are no good arguments 
for it but that there is a strong intuition that it is true. My point rather is that 
it is false that every rational person would find conceptualism intuitively 
plausible, but true that (a) there are no rationally compelling arguments for 
or against conceptualism and that (b) a rational person may find conceptual-
ism intuitively plausible but an equally r!!tional person may find platonism 
or nominalism intuitively plausible. I shall suggest that the relevant premises 
in the conceptualist and some other theistic arguments are synthetic a priori 
propositions that are neither self-evident nor capable of being demonstrated 
to all rational persons. 
A person is rational if and only if her beliefs are compatible with (i) the 
observational facts of common sense, (ii) the currently warranted scientific 
theories, (iii) the principles of inductive and deductive logic, and (iv) set 
theory and mathematics. Since there probably exists no person all of whose 
beliefs meet these conditions, the notion of a rational person should be tacitly 
understood as relativized to the proposition or argument under discussion: A 
person is rational with respect to a proposition p or argument A if and only 
if her set of beliefs about p or A are compatible with (i) the observational 
facts of common sense, (ii) the currently warranted scientific theories, (iii) 
the principles of inductive and deductive logic, and (iv) set theory and mathe-
matics. For example, a person is rational with respect to the argument All humans 
are mortal: Socrates is human; therefore, Socrates is mortal, if the person's set 
of beliefs about this argument is the unit set [belief that it is sound]. 
My definition of a rational person is not meant to analyze the ordinary 
meaning of "rational person," since my definition is much too restrictive, but 
it is useful for the purposes of explaining the epistemic status of the premises 
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in the theistic arguments I shall discuss. Ordinarily, we would call a person 
"rational" even if the person violated some of the conditions; e.g. Frege was 
a "rational person" in the ordinary sense even though his views on sets 
entailed a contradiction in first order logic. 
The definition of a rational person is controversial or ambiguous at least 
inasmuch as it is controversial which logic (tense logic, modal logic, para-
consistent logic, etc.), scientific theory (string theory, supergravity, etc.), set 
theory, etc. is to be chosen, but these controversies will not affect the follow-
ing discussion. 
One point of contention between conceptualists and platonists concerns the 
truth value of 
(5) Necessarily, every proposition is an effect of some mind. 
The truth value of (5) cannot be settled by observation or induction, if only 
for the reason of (5)'s modal operator. If not an a posteriori statement, it is 
either analytically or synthetically a priori. Now it is dubious at best to regard 
(5) as analytically true. The concept of a proposition includes such concepts 
as having relations or properties among its parts. having parts that are 
ordered to each other in a certain way, and being a bearer of a truth value (as-
suming the principle of bivalence). Perhaps the concept of a proposition also 
includes the concept being understandable or possibly. being an object of a 
propositional attitude, but even if these latter concepts are included they do 
not entail conceptualism since a platonist would freely admit that each propo-
sition can be grasped by some possible mind. But it is implausible to think 
that the concept of a proposition includes the concept of being the effect of 
some mind. 
Perhaps the concept of a judgement includes the concept of being the result 
of an act of judgement, but even if "judgement" (in one of its uses) expresses 
this mentalist concept, it is not an analytic truth that every proposition is a 
judgement. 
This suggests the view that (5) is a synthetic a priori truth or falsehood. 
(5) is synthetic if only for the reason that neither of the two concepts ex-
pressed by "is an effect of some mind" and "is not an effect of any mind" is 
a part of the concept expressed by "proposition." (5) is a priori in that its 
true value is not knowable by virtue of empirical observations but by virtue 
of reflection on the proposition itself (or by reflection upon other a priori 
propositions that entail or are entailed by it. 
Now it is clear that (5) if true is not self-evident, where a synthetic a priori 
proposition p is self-evident if and only if any person who is rational with 
respect to p would believe p simply by virtue of understanding p. An example 
of a synthetic a priori proposition that is self-evident is that no body can be 
simultaneously red all over and green all over. (5) is not self-evident since 
there exist persons, viz., some platonists and nominalists, who are rational 
with respect to (5) and yet both understand and reject (5). I would suggest 
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that (5) also does not have a rationally compelling proof. A proof of a syn-
thetic a priori proposition is rationally compelling if and only if any person 
who is rational with respect to the proof and who understood the proof would 
believe the premises true and the conclusion validly derived. An example of 
a rationally compelling proof is that no body can be one color all over and 
simultaneously be a different color all over; red is a different color than 
green; therefore, no body can be simultaneously red all over and green all 
over. I believe it would be acknowledged that there exists in the literature no 
rationally compelling proof of the truth or falsity of (5), and I cannot think 
of how any such proof could possibly be constructed. 
If (5) is neither self-evident nor provable in a rationally compelling way, 
it may be rationally acceptable. A synthetic a priori proposition p is rationally 
acceptable (and no more) for a person x if and only if, (1) neither p nor not-p 
are self-evident or compellingly provable and (2) p appears true to x even 
after x has considered possible objections to p and considered p's relations 
to other relevant propositions that x believes or disbelieves, and (3) x is 
rational with respect to p. 
If (5) is rationally acceptable (and no more), then the conceptalist argument 
for God's existence is not a rationally compelling proof. Rather, it is a ra-
tionally acceptable argument. An argument A for a thesis T is rationally 
acceptable (and no more) to x if and only if (1) A is not a rationally compel-
ling proof of T and there is no rationally compelling proof of not-T, (2) A 
appears sound to x even after x has considered possible objections to A and 
considered A's relations to other relevant arguments he accepts or rejects, and 
(3) x is rational with respect to A. 
I think the conceptualist argument for God's existence may be compared 
in this respect with the other traditional arguments for God's existence, es-
pecially with the cosmological and ontological arguments. A key premise of 
some forms of the cosmological argument is the principle of sufficient reason, 
which has at least two versions. One strong version is 
(6) Necessarily, everything that exists has a reason why it exists; 
and one weak version is 
(7) Necessarily, everything that begins to exist has a reason why it exists. 
These are not analytic principles and their modal operator prevents them from 
being merely inductive generalizations. Thus, it is plausible to regard (6) and 
(7) as synthetic a priori truths if true at all. But it is notorious, however, that 
some philosophers who are rational with respect to (6) and (7) believe (6) or 
(7) and other philosophers who are similarly rational disbelieve (6) and (7). 
If this is the case, and the other conditions of a rational acceptable argument 
are met, then the cosmological argument is not a rationally compelling but 
merely a rationally acceptable argument for God's existence. 
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The same holds for the ontological argument. In Plantinga's version, for 
example, the premise 
(8) Unsurpassable greatness is possibly exemplified 
is taken by Plantinga to be a proposition a rational person could accept or 
reject. 11 Plantinga does not characterize this proposition as synthetic and a 
priori, but it is obviously not an empirical generalization and the sentence 
that expresses it is not reducible to a tautology by substitution of synonyms 
for synonyms. It seems natural, then, to regard it as a synthetic a priori truth 
if true. Given Plantinga's own admission that a rational person could accept 
or reject (8), the ontological argument in Plantinga's version is not a ration-
ally compelling argument for God's existence. 
If none of the other theistic arguments (e.g. the teleological argument or 
the argument from mystical experience) are rationally compelling, then the 
best the theist can hope for is to establish the rational acceptability of theism. 
The explicit formulation of the conceptalist argument for theism in this paper 
thus may be interpreted as contributing to establishing the rational accept-
ability of theism. 
But I would note that the argument of this paper is different than and does 
not entail that theistic (or atheistic) belief is basic. The point rather is that 
theistic belief is based on reasons, albeit acceptable rather than compelling 
reasons, and that there is an additional acceptable reason to the familiar ones, 
viz., the premises of the conceptalist argument for God's existence. 
However, this way of understanding the argument of this paper must be 
made with qualifications, for I have not discussed the issue of whether there 
is a rationally compelling argument for atheism. If there is such an argument, 
then no argument for theism is rationally acceptable. But the issue of 
atheological arguments falls outside the scope of this paper.12 
Western Michigan University 
NOTES 
1. Other versions of actualism define possibilities in terms of other sub-classes of 
actualities, such as states of affairs (Plantinga), properties (Stalnaker) and sentences 
(Hintikka). See Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1974), Robert Stalnaker, "Possible Worlds," in The Possible and the Actual, ed. M. 
Loux (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 225-234, and Jaakko Hintikka, "The 
Modes of Modality," ibid., pp. 65-79. 
2. The power-set axiom precludes the possibility that there is a set of all truths. See 
Selmer Bringsjord, "Are There Set Theoretic Possible Worlds?," Analysis 45.1 (1985), 
Christopher Menzel, "On Set Theoretic Possible Worlds," Analysis 46.2 (1986), and 
Patrick Grim, "On Sets and Worlds: A Reply to Menzel," Analysis 46.4 (1986). 
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3. The actual world should not be confused with the universe, the aggregate of all 
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